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Foreword
These meetings on women and international security were aimed
at exploring regional, South Asian, initiatives and building co-
operative networks within an overall framework of gender and
security.
It would indeed be very useful for the world as a whole if women
can play a greater role in determining our security options, our
view of security as a whole and the way that women might be
able to operate in a world where conflict has not yet disappeared.
I think the need for such meetings arises because the number of
women in our diplomatic services or even in our academic
community is still very small. It is increasing but not very rapidly.
So as the number of women in these services increases and the
number of women looking at these problems increases, it is
interesting to speculate whether new ideas, new dimensions will
influence thinking on security matters.
South Asia is a very special area of the world and I think that
anything we can do to reduce tensions and enhance a sense of
collective security of the nations here will be a great step forward.
Prof Roddam Narasimha
Director, National Institute of Advanced Studies
vii
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Women and Security in a Regional Setting:
A Framework for Analysis
Dr Deepa M. Ollapally
A major aim of these workshops has been to explore the
possibilities of regionalizing gender and security initiatives, so
that we can not only come up with a regional perspective in a
theoretical sense but also from a networking perspective, and a
policy perspective. From these three different perspectives, what
are the ways in which one can think regionally about this question?
In other words, can we really talk about, first of all, a South
Asian gender perspective on security? In political terms, is there
a distinctive South Asian political subsystem that informs and
shapes gender and international relations? Also, in social-cultural
terms, can we define a South Asian identity that is unique with
shared characteristics, particularly on gender matters? The agenda
here is to contemplate appropriate regional activities based on a
better understanding of regional dynamics. One can’t talk about
regional initiatives unless you really understand the regional
interactions and the dynamics. One has to come up with some
kind of broader, somewhat analytical, framework or at least ask
some fundamental questions which I think we’re going to have
to be answering. We are going to be confronted with these
questions for a long time to come whether we like it or not. So
it’s in that spirit that I want to raise some questions right at the
outset.
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One question, which invariably comes up, is whether a gendered
perspective on international relations or international security
really makes a difference or can make a difference at all. When
we look at the current international system, we see states that are
driven mostly by a deep sense of insecurity, vis-à-vis each other,
they’re in competition with each other, for power, for status, for
resources. And, we have of course gone through the 19th century
emergence of nationalism as a very, very serious and critical
variable, of a sort that influenced policymaking. Nationalism has
not proven to be something that is going to evaporate, it has been
persistent and in some places it became stronger in the waning
days of the 20th century despite some of the predictions made
earlier.
So, can we offer a gender perspective as an alternative way of
ordering the world system? Or is it just an approach which would
allow us to sort of tinker on the margins of this existing reality
and on the margins of the sort of dominant, realpolitik, realist
approach?
A related question is whether there are fundamental differences
in male/female perspectives on security, on the state, and if so,
how do they differ and are they significant? Now this could be
purely empirical work. I mean, it would not require a great deal
of effort in one sense to simply do empirical field work to try to
see in what ways this differs, if it indeed does differ. We could
do this empirical work without prejudice to whether roles and
predispositions are socially constructed or somehow or other
essentialized. One doesn’t really have to get into a sort of very
nasty and complicated theoretical debate to simply to look at this
kind of empirical question.
Another question that I would like to raise is how much of the
gender and security agenda is in fact a western-driven agenda?
What are the dominant frameworks being used and do the main
issues resonate in the non-western world? Is there a kind of
universal approach to gender and security, and if not, what is the
role of differing social cultures in defining terms that are important
to gender and security? One thing that is interesting is that both
the conventional wisdom, the dominant approaches analyzing
international relations and security, as well as the critiques, are
coming from the west. They’re both located in the west. And so,
it’s the western, mostly western feminists, who are at the forefront
of critiquing realism and realpolitik, which has been of course
the dominant discourse in international relations. Now, it’s not
clear at all, for a number of reasons, whether these critiques
themselves don’t have certain biases, which would obviously
have implications for our own thinking, when we’re developing
enquiry in this field.
Let me just add a word on sort of this critique. In explaining the
behavior of states, when we try to look at the way in which states
carry out policy, realism, which is the dominant approach, uses
the analogy of the Hobbesian state of nature. The Hobbesian
South Asian Women in International SecurityReport
man is the political equivalent of the western economic man, if
you will, driven by rational self-interest, highly individualistic,
pursuing his economic goals without any real social obligation to
the larger community. If you extrapolate this a little bit into a
self-seeking system – international self-seeking system – the
greatest value would be accorded to self-help, autonomy and
power. Many contemporary western feminists have challenged
this notion of international behavior and have pointed out that
these attributes best represent masculinism.
As many scholars have pointed out, most feminists in the west
are liberal feminists in their consciousness. In other words, they
are essentially in many ways similar to the Hobbesian economic
man in their own thinking. Now this means that their feminism
is deeply rooted in an ideology of individualism and individual
freedom and choice as being at the forefront. The earlier western
feminists of the 1970s and 1980s had tended to argue for the
view that women should have the same rights as men and those
who did that would put, for example, individual women’s rights
above the rights of families, above the rights of the community,
if you will. The liberal philosophy underlying this doesn’t really
have a way of tempering individual rights with responsibilities to
the family, to society, and the larger community. And there’s still
very little attention given to this tension, given to this
problematique, in terms of a serious concentration on the social
responsibilities of women and men within the liberal feminist
discourse in the literature - at least in the literature coming out
of the west. Now this is perfectly natural in a western, and I
would say particularly American, social system that is after all
embedded in liberal individualism. But I think in a South Asian
environment, this would be a major concern. And I don’t think
we can get away from that.
These sorts of symptomatic problems of the general western
thinking – feminist thinking – on the subject I’m afraid, might
colour to some extent the literature on gender and international
relations. If we go back to that archetypal Hobbesian man for a
moment and look at the masculine attributes associated with him
which are then extrapolated into the international system, it does
beg the question of whether masculinity itself means the same
thing across cultures and across societies? To put it rather crudely,
or simplistically, in what way, for example, does the notion of
machismo – the western notions of machismo – how does it have
a relationship to notions of masculinity in India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka? How do these notions –
different sets of notions associated with masculinity – get
propagated if at all in the broader regional and international
context? So in a sense, the question really is: what are the
constructions of masculinity across cultures? And do they share
certain fundamental similarities or don’t they? There are some
analysts, such as Carol Cohen, who have written extensively
about strategic discourse in the US and the manner in which
much of the strategic discourse is really symbolic language having
to do with male sexuality and sexual domination. And she
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particularly notes that in the realm of nuclear weaponry. Now
can we in turn see strong parallels, weak parallels or no parallels
with the western strategic discourse and the dialogue that is now
emerging here, given the fact that the nuclear issue is one of the
central aspects of strategic discourse?
In the same way, our cultural conceptions of things like power,
security, prestige, and status – all of these things, which are very
crucial to the way in which international relations is conceived
– are they really meaningfully similar across situations and
societies? For example, how should one treat the notion of power
being exercised by someone like the Ayatollah Khameni in Iran,
who is really one of the most critical political leaders in Iran at
the moment? As a cleric, he is exercising power – how do we
look at this vis-à-vis someone like Bill Clinton exercising power?
There are obviously differences. And it seems to me that
somewhere along the line one has to wonder if a singular
masculinist framework can really capture all of these various
divergences. And it’s not going to come from the west – this sort
of questioning will not come from the west – they won’t even
perhaps see this as an issue, like we do here in South Asia.
To take a somewhat different tack but continuing along this line
of thinking about the possibility of a South Asian approach, it
seems to me that there has to be some way of taking into account
the fact that the current international system is still hierarchical
and indeed hegemonic. The role of the state, the position of the
state is also impinged by the unequal international system in
terms of whether you want to call it dependence or vulnerability
or what have you. But I think one has to be able to look at the
mediating role of the post-colonialist international system in
defining national identity, security in the developing countries. It
seems it would be important to factor that into our own analysis
of gender and security, which, as I’ve said, is really absent in
western reality. Therefore, it’s not surprising that it’s absent in
western discourse. Moreover in the South Asian context, we
would have to consider forces such as communalism, ethnic
conflict, in order to fully understand security discourses and
practices and see how if taking a gendered perspective indeed
leads us to a better understanding of these issues of South Asian
politics.
Overall I think there are two or three things we should keep in
mind. One is that the trend in international relations clearly has
been to formulate increasingly sophisticated and detailed critiques
of the western masculinist biases – that I think is what we’ve
seen more and more of. They’re getting more detailed, more
sophisticated but really they are essentially nuanced versions of
the same sort of arguments. For a gendered international relations
to make sense for South Asia, I think we have to go beyond this
narrow preoccupation to one that goes beyond gender and takes
into account social and cultural factors. How one does this really
is dependent on the scholarship and thinking that comes out of
this region. At least that much is very clear to me – it will not
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come from the west or any other place. So if this is going to
come out, it will have to come from South Asian scholars. And
one of the particular points is to have a sufficient mass of people
doing it so that at any point in time, there should be a critical
mass from which one can engage with the broader dialogue.
Secondly, even if we were to look at some of the conventional
international relations approaches, we do find some changes taking
place. There is an increasing recognition of the importance of
understanding gender, even to explain so-called big politics and
big history. Let me just for example take one case here – Paul
Kennedy. In Paul Kennedy’s book on the rise and decline of
great powers and their interactions, there is no reference really
to gender or women’s issues and so on. However, when Kennedy
went back and began to forecast international politics into the
next 50 years, into the 21st century, it turned out that one key
variable for his analysis was the social consequences of
demographic transitions.
This in turn forced Kennedy to see changes in the role of women
as a critical variable in determining 21st century realities.
Normally the role of women in such large-scale historical and
political changes is rarely investigated but the fact is that research
has shown over time – thanks in large part to the women’s
movement over the last many years – it has been increasingly
demonstrating a strong causal link between increasing gender
equality and the rapid and non-disruptive completion of the
demographic transition. And therefore, he was forced to actually
take into account that this is in fact a very, very important factor
to explain large-scale changes in the world system. So in a sense,
an assumption rising out of this would be is that rapid population
increases in societies where women don’t enjoy basic equalities
could lead to crises in other social institutions, which of course
then has implications for the overall global political economy
and the prospects for different societies within it. So the link is
clearly there and I’m glad Kennedy finally saw that and wrote
about it.
Finally, leaving aside the conceptual terrain and whatever
framework one wants to put one’s own work into or however you
may define oneself – as a feminist or otherwise – I think there
is one immediate compulsion that probably all of us could agree
on. And that is how to increase access for women to political
power and increase access to political decision-making. How do
you bring women’s experiences and skills out of the so-called
private sphere and into the more public domain? How can
decision-makers be encouraged to listen to women’s experiences
and women’s notions of various things without having to see
whether or not in fact there is a difference of approach or in
viewpoints?
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Armed Conflict and Political
Participation of Women
Dr. N Shantha Mohan
Background
The information for this paper is drawn from two baseline studies,
i.e. “Women in Armed Conflict Situations” and “Political
Participation of Women in India”, supported by the International
Women’s Rights Action Watch-Asia Pacific. The former study
was coordinated by the North-East Network and the latter by the
Gender studies Unit of the National Institute of Advanced Studies.
Apart from establishing the incidence and forms of violence
women face in such situations, it aims at evincing the need for
women to participate in politics to effectively articulate and
negotiate their demand for a life free from violence.
The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), also known as the Women’s Convention
and the Women’s Bill of Rights, was adopted by the UN General
assembly in 1979 and ratified by India in 1993. It is the most popular
international treaty that deals with women’s human rights. Though
the spirit and context of the Convention in effect addresses the
structural causes of violence and discrimination women face in
different spheres of their lives, the text of CEDAW does not have
a specific article with relation to women in armed conflict. However
several articles of the Convention and General Recommendations
12 and 19 of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women apply to the situation.
 
Women and Armed Conflict
In situations of armed conflict, while the entire community gets
affected, the effect on women is intense and complex. The term
security should transcend its narrow definition to include all rights
and freedoms of women, both in the personal and public domains.
It should be reiterated that as the focus is on women and their
concerns, it is necessary that the whole question of violence that
is perpetrated from the personal to the public to the conflict
situation be addressed. Women perceive and experience violence
differently from that defined by men and the state. Further, it
varies among the women themselves according to the roles they
play in the situation. The study has identified six such different
groups of women and has been able to capture what security means
to them in a conflict situation. They are: a) women relatives of
armed activists, b) women relatives of state armed forces,
c) women militants, d) women as shelter providers, e) women as
victims of sexual and physical abuse and f) women as peace
negotiators. However, all of them, irrespective of their roles, have
to a greater extent been victims of sexual and physical abuse.
This victimisation cuts across ethnic, communal and all other
identities of women, except that of gender.
Conflict is also location-specific and therefore understood
differently by those residing in the hills as against those in the
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plains. The primary question is whether women, in a conflict
situation, need to be seen in the context of their ethnicity or that
of their gender. However, even the women under pressures of
intense conflict tend to give more importance to ethnic rather
than their gender identity, resulting in the latter getting subsumed
in the dominant ethnic struggle. It is not only the state that views
women in a neutral and non-gendered manner – this view is also
perpetrated by the community, family and other vested groups
due to which women lose their identity as women.
While women are victims of state perpetrated violence, there is
even the prevalence of violence between and within ethnic groups.
Inter and intra ethnic violence between and among marginalised
and tribal communities living in armed conflict situations also
increases insecurity for the women. This is mainly due to the
limited access and control over the already depleted and scarce
resources available to them. The struggles are therefore on the
one hand as an ethnic group and on the other as independent
communities. Because of which, there is evidence of much inter-
tribal conflict, and conflict even between militant groups. Each
of these forms of conflict impact women differently and thereby
their understanding of security too. But, in all, it marginalises the
rights of women and fails to recognise the differential impact
that mainstream human rights approach has on women. Women,
irrespective of the category they belong to, have a common
reaction to the kinds of violence and sufferings they face and
therefore able to transcend their differences on this issue. But
these women loose their gender identity when it is the question
of their ethnic and community identity.
The other questions are whether there is large-scale migration of
women in search of livelihood systems and different safe places
and an increase in the incidence of women in the sex trade because
of the conflict. The phenomena of forced migration and
vulnerability to physical, mental and sexual abuse and even
killings is on the increase. The women are especially susceptible
to violence due to ethnic clashes and that perpetrated by the state,
which is supposed to guard and protect them. Such violence has
restricted the mobility of women and confined them to their homes
and has also affected their livelihoods, food security and
properties. Often, they are responsible for running households
single handedly. As a group, primarily addressing issues regarding
women’s rights, the violations of freedoms and victimisation
women face is the focus.
Though several legislations have been enacted, they lack special
provisions to address concerns of women in conflict. In particular,
the intermittent operation of the Armed Forces Special Powers
Act since 1958 has contributed to the high incidence of violence
in the region. Some of the salient features of the Act are that it
gives unbridled powers to the armed forces to shoot to kill in
order to maintain order; enter, search and arrest without warrant
or use any amount of force to effect the arrest. It gives almost
total immunity to the armed forces as no prosecution, suit or legal
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proceedings can be brought against them without the permission
of the Central Government. Where men are either in hiding or
killed, the women are vulnerable to victimisation under the Act.
The tribal communities are governed by customary laws, which
are gender insensitive. They are deeply entrenched within
patriarchal values of control and domination of women. Because
of this, the participation of women in politics and decision-making
bodies is extremely low, whether they are the traditional bodies
or the democratic institutions. Further, the absence of a facilitating
and enabling environment prevents women from entering politics.
As such the space for articulating and making the voices heard
on the basis of their gender identity is entirely lacking. In this
context, it needs to be pointed out that women have been
socialized to believe and internalize the notion that they are the
transmitters of their culture and therefore they have to carry on
what has been handed over to them as an ethnic group, rather
than as a woman.
It needs to be remembered that those very women who have lost
their men in conflict, are the ones who provide, nurture, care and
work towards maintaining their families. However, in the
framework of human rights, they are not given the same
importance as the men who have lost their lives. The burden
women shoulder under such harsh conditions has not been
considered as a matter of security, though it is their security that
is at stake. It includes their economic and physical security, to be
mobile, and to have access to resources. It is evinced that the
major item of expenditure incurred is on providing for the armed
forces and not for the betterment of the communities and the civil
society.
The phenomenon of women being forced to service men in the
armed forces is justified on the grounds that they are the men
who have sacrificed their personal wellbeing to provide security
in the region and therefore need satiation of their desires. Thus,
the state which is supposed to be the guardian of protecting the
rights of its citizens is often the cause for the violation of the
same rights. The women also face similar problems with the
militant groups. Therefore women are victimised and exploited,
both by the security forces and the militants. The State is unable
to provide the basic necessities of life as the major share of the
financial allocations and the resources are used for maintaining
the armed forces. In addition to the scarce resources, the presence
of the armed forces inhibits women’s free mobility to work and
therefore to the incomes that are absolutely essential for their
very survival. The most vulnerable under these conditions are
the children, the elderly and the disabled.
The conflict situation has adversely affected all dimensions of
everyday life. Girl children, in particular, are unable to attend
schools because of the fear of being abused. Further, the schools
are located away from their homes and they are afraid of being
caught in crossfire. Primary health care is weak because of break
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down of services and the reluctance of health personnel to work
in such conflict-ridden areas. Women are not even able to go and
get fuel for their everyday consumption. In all, the women do not
enjoy their rights and their rights remain subsumed in mainstream
conflict considerations.
Women and Governance
Women face the same kind of exclusion in their participation in
politics as in the armed conflict situation. Over the last few
decades, their numbers in formal political bodies have shown only
a marginal increase, with their number never having exceeded 15
percent of all seats in the parliament and 7 percent in the
legislatures. Among all the states in India, as of 1998, Delhi
records the highest proportion of nearly 13 percent.
Noting the low participation of women in politics, the government
of India, in the year 1993, adopted an affirmative action for
providing reservation for women in Local Self-Governing
institutions through Constitutional Amendments. Prior to the
Amendments, only the state of Karnataka had 25 per cent
reservation for women in local bodies. The 73rd Constitutional
Amendment Act introduced 33 per cent reservation for women
in the Panchayat Raj institutions in the rural areas. Similarly, the
74th Constitutional Amendment Act provides for 33 per cent
reservation for women in Nagara Palika and Municipalities in
towns and urban areas. In spite of such action, some States like
Bihar and North-East have had no elections to these bodies. It is
only through the intervention of the court that elections have been
held in Bihar.
With these amendments, at least at the local levels, over a million
women are now actively participating in shaping the policies and
programmes of the country. However, such affirmative action has
not been extended to the higher echelons of governance. The 81st,
84th and 85th Amendment Bills providing for reservation for
women at the Parliament and Legislature levels have been stalled
for not having reservations within reservation for women on the
basis of caste. This has become a highly debated issue and it is
worth noting that none of the arguments that have been brought
up against them came up during the passage of the far more
historic 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments providing for
reservation at the local levels of governance. The resistance to
such a reservation is because the presence of one-third numbers
of women to the total number of seats would displace that many
numbers of men from holding positions of power. They would in
due course be in a position to progressively empower themselves
and therefore become a power that male representatives would
have to contend with. They would also be able to harness the
support of strong and vibrant constituencies of both women and
men. These inherent fears have been manifested through the
absence of enabling structures for women to contest and win
elections; the lack of financial and human support for them by
political parties and family members; increasing violence and
criminalisation of politics; character assassination of those women
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who assert themselves and the general impediments they pose
for women to occupy positions of power.
While political space has been created for women at the local
and district levels by the affirmative action of the state, they have
not been able to guarantee a non-discriminative and enabling
environment for women to participate. Mechanisms to protect
women in politics from character assassination, criminalisation
and extensive use of money and muscle power by males in politics
are also inadequate. Another major impediment to women’s
effective participation is the lack of awareness among them of
their rights and responsibilities as elected members. This increases
their vulnerability to negative experiences.
Therefore, there is little or no participation of women in decision-
making processes. The women’s agenda gets subsumed in
mainstream political processes, where the agenda set by the
dominant, and by men, takes priority. Women lack an enabling
environment, which provides the space for them to articulate their
demands and/or create the pressure on the state to be responsive
to their own needs and that of their constituencies. Even if there
are women, they are there only figuratively and do not have any
voice to negotiate their demands or represent the interests of other
women. Further, women do not have and/or are unable to nurture
a supportive and vibrant constituency, particularly that of women,
to back them in their negotiations. In the presence of such
impediments, it becomes extremely difficult for women to centre-
stage women’s concerns, increase their visibility and bring about
the desired change in the existing political dialogue.
At the higher levels of political institutions; i.e. the legislatures and
the parliament, the number of women elected is abysmally low. This
despite the fact that the number of women contesting elections has
been consistently increasing. Political parties seem uniformly reluctant
to field women candidates. The latest data reveals that in the parliament
their representation does not exceed 8 percent. For the states, Delhi
has the highest number of women members (12.9 per cent) followed
by Andhra Pradesh and Kerala (9.5 and 9.5 per cent) respectively. Not
having a critical mass within the political institutions makes it difficult
for women to push their agenda forward. The lack of an active and
articulate critical number of elected women representatives impairs
them from accessing decision-making positions, negotiating for
important portfolios and mainstreaming gender issues in policy and
programmes. Even where there are articulate and assertive women
representatives, they are deliberately marginalised through a process
of exclusion by the dominant and the powerful. The few women who
are in decision-making positions are invariably given ‘soft portfolios’
which are generally the extension of the women’s stereotypical image.
In the absence of political allies in key positions to support them and
little or no access and control over resources and decision-making
powers, they are relegated to the background.
There exists a lot of resistance to elected women representatives
because of the belief that women occupy these positions due to
18 19
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tokenism and male-dominated support extended to them through
families or political parties. However, it must be realised that
even this token visibility due to their physical presence in political
institutions in itself can be considered the first step to their active
participation. However, to facilitate women’s participation, there
is a need to work closely with the state and the civil society.
Elected women representatives remain silent and voiceless and
accept what is given to them. They rarely oppose dominant
structures, in order to retain their own positions and power. This is
possible because women often get naturalised to the ways of the
dominant masculine culture. In order to free them from the process
of internalising the dominant view-points in governance, women
need to be empowered so that they are able to represent their own
agenda and/ or get the dominant sections to voice the concerns of
women. Thus, to facilitate women’s effective political participation,
governance should be engendered. In a longitudinal study
undertaken by the Gender Studies Unit of the National Institute of
Advanced Studies involving research, action and advocacy on
‘Engendering Decentralised Governance’, it was revealed that both
women and men defined ‘effective governance’ somewhat similarly.
Accordingly, all activities and outcomes that were visible were
identified as the parameters for measuring effectiveness. But, the
study also revealed a subtle difference in the priorities of women
and men in the activities envisaged by them. Women, generally
prioritised activities that were considered invisible, as they had no
immediate measures for evaluating effectiveness. Thus, their
contribution has been measured against parameters and norms
defined by the dominant and as such been deemed ‘ineffective’.
Therefore, the parameters of measuring governance should be
developed to not only incorporate consciously the male and female
perspectives but also involve both men and women in this process
of engendering governance. It is imperative for both women and
men to be partners in struggling for the rights of women and
therefore for a just society. Without this direction, women will be
segregated and excluded in the mainstream dialogue and discussions
of identity, power and decision-making.
Governance in the tribal areas
According to the 1991 census, the scheduled tribes (ST) constitute
8.08 per cent of the total population in India. They are spread unevenly
over different regions of the country. The Constitution of India in its
Articles 244(1) and (2) in part X has listed the “Scheduled Areas”
and “Scheduled Tribes” under the Fifth and Sixth Schedules
respectively. The Fifth Schedule refers to the tribal dominated areas
in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Himachal
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Maharashtra, Orrisa and
Rajasthan. While the Sixth Schedule refers to the administration of
the tribal areas in the Northeastern region including the states of
Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura.
The rationale behind the notification of the scheduled areas has
been to assist the tribal population in enjoying their existing rights
and to develop and promote the economic, educational, and social
20 21
South Asian Women in International SecurityReport
progress of the tribal inhabitants. The Fifth Schedule envisages a
special system of administration for the areas directly under the
Governors of the state under the direction of the Central
Government. It is based on the premise that that it should be in
consonance with the customary laws, social practices and
traditional management of community resources. As per this
schedule the State government is responsible for implementing
the provisions pertaining to the welfare and general development
of scheduled tribes in the region. It also provides for Tribal
Advisory Council, which is an advisory body that prevents the
exploitation and discrimination of the tribal population. One of
its most important functions is to facilitate governance of the
scheduled areas in the larger interest of the tribals.
The Sixth Schedule provides for a separate mechanism of
administration in the States of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and
Mizoram. Entry 2 of the Schedule provides for the setting of
District and Regional Councils in each autonomous district and
region. It confers powers of legislation and administration of
justice on the district councils apart from endowing them with
executive, developmental and financial responsibilities. They have
a traditional jury-based legal system evolved indigenously by the
tribal societies. This body has the right to own and dispose of
property and the right to sue and be sued.
In conclusion the Fifth and Sixth Schedules facilitate the tribals
to retain their customary practices and the traditional laws framed
by them to enable governance of the scheduled areas in the larger
interest of the tribals. The Acts of Parliament and the legislature
of the State will not be applicable to these states unless it is
specifically made applicable through separate notifications.
India has adopted a bold, affirmative action approach through
Constitutional amendments by way of providing for one-third
reservation for women in all local self-governance institutions. It
also provides for reservation of the posts of Chairpersons and Deputy
Chairpersons in these bodies. However, the provisions of the 73rd
and 74th amendments to the Constitution of India were not made
applicable to the Scheduled and tribal areas. Subsequently it was
made applicable to the Fifth Scheduled areas as per the provisions
of the Panchayats (Extension of Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996.
In the above Schedules, in the scheduled areas, which are
predominantly tribal, the village councils are the institutions in the
field of administration, religion, politics, economics, justice and so
on. Generally, it is found that these councils do not have women
members, and in cases where there are women, they hold peripheral
positions. Their absence in local institutions has led the women to
take a divided stand on the issue of reservation at the higher levels
of governance. For example, in Nagaland, during an interaction
with the National Commission of Women in 1998, the Naga women
were of the opinion that it was crucial for women to be represented
on the village councils first, where decisions affecting their lives
were taken. They stressed on the power yielded by the village
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councils and were apprehensive of the fact that even if reservation
is to be introduced at the state and parliament levels, the results
of such elections would continue to be determined by these
councils with minimal support to the concerns of women.
The number of women in the state assemblies as per the latest
statistics reveals the complete absence of women in the states of
Mizoram and Nagaland (1998). In the remaining states of
Meghalaya (1998), Tripura (1998) and Assam (1996) they do not
exceed 5 per cent.
Their low numbers may be the reason for their inability to
negotiate for reservation in the lower tiers of governance i.e. the
village councils or to push for specific notifications. This gives a
clear indication that an affirmative action state initiative is
necessary and in the context the 85th Amendment Bill seeking
one-third reservation for women in the parliamentary and
legislative seats becomes an extremely important alternative.
Conclusion
The lack of a critical mass of women in decision-making
institutions impedes them in participating in mainstream and male
dominated dialogue on what constitutes security. The accumulation
and consolidation of power through violence is what is absorbing
the male discourse on security. But, such a discourse does not
include the violence experienced by women, both from the state
and within their homes. Thus, the meaning attached to security is
entirely different from the one given by men, who center-stage
ethnic identity rather than gender, thereby subsuming the importance
of the rights of women to even a minimum means of livelihood
and their basic needs. There is a need for a comprehensive definition
of security which includes all dimensions of the lives of women –
economic, social, educational, political, legal and so on. This
definition and the elements of it need to be in a common and
accepted vocabulary that emphasizes the identity and perspective
of women transcending their ethnic, communal, racial and regional
identities. By so doing, there is the possibility of evolving an
international perspective and orientation to security as defined by
women. This would provide the opportunity for women to be the
main players in developing networks and strengthening regional
co-operation and participating effectively in international politics.
The presence of women in large numbers at all levels of
governance and decision-making bodies can also have a
tremendous impact on the State and other international agencies,
in that they can pressurise and facilitate them to fulfill their
obligation for ensuring women’s equality and their rights.
I thank Ms. Shanthi Dhairam and International Women’s Rights
Action Watch -Asia Pacific (IWRAW-AP) for supporting and
facilitating these researches using the rights framework. I am
grateful to Dr. Roshmi Goswamy and the North-East Network
(NEN) for permitting me to use the material on Women in Armed
Conflict situation.
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Executive Summary of the proceedings
of the International Workshop
Dr Deepa M. Ollapally
Introduction
On July 30-31, 1998 the International Strategic Studies Unit at the
National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) Bangalore held an
international workshop on “South Asian Women in International
Security: Building Cooperative Networks.” The Workshop was
chaired by Dr. Deepa Ollapally. Participants from Bangladesh,
India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Uganda and Australia
attended the Workshop. The Workshop was designed to approach
the question of security and gender in South Asia by broadening
the concept of security to “comprehensive security,” and taking up
issues which are transnational in nature, with a strong gender
component. The aim of the Workshop was three fold:
1. To bring together women experts working in more
conventional international relations/security with those
involved in non-traditional security, especially with gender
implications.
2. To launch a regional network for shared access to information
and experience; for building sustained collective efforts in
areas of common concern; and serving as a vital link in non-
formal diplomacy.
3. To provide a forum for professional development with the
objective of increasing participation and access of women in
the region in decision making in government agencies,
international institutions, nongovernmental organisations, and
opinion making and expert bodies.
The participants were drawn from academia, media, policy
community and NGOs. The spanned a considerable spectrum in
terms of seniority, age and political persuasion. This particular
mix was an important element in the crafting of the Workshop.
In South Asia, this initiative is the first of its kind and as such,
in some ways, the Workshop was an experiment or pilot project.
As circumstances would have it, it also turned out to be one of
the very first (if not the first) nongovernmental/expert interactions
between Indians and Pakistanis in either of the two countries
after the May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. Despite
this backdrop, it deserves to be emphasised that the atmosphere
at the Workshop itself was entirely cordial and not at all vitiated
by the heightened state to state tensions. For this, the participants
are to be individually applauded.
Emergent Themes from Discussions and Working Groups
A number of basic themes emanated from the discussions, which
may be characterised in the following manner. These are
essentially issues which formed the parameters, assumptions for
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building blocks in thinking about gender and security, broadly
speaking.
I. Situating Selves
A number of the participants had not viewed their work in terms
of the notion of security of transnationalism, nor indeed considered
the possible link between gender and comprehensive security
until the Workshop presented these issues along those lines. One
basic question which ran through the discussions (implicitly and
explicitly) was whether a “feminist” perspective on security was
necessary to underpin discussions or not.
Working Group A: Revisioning Gender and International Relations,
addressed this issue to an extent, with some divergence of opinion.
This difference was reflected in the larger plenary body as well,
with strong differences particularly between those in NGOs versus
those in government, bureaucracy and policy arenas. Two main
tendencies were apparent. One suggested a wholescale
reconceptualization of security, particularly through a feminist
critique of Neorealist theory focusing on militarism, gender and
violence, ideology, and the reification of the nation state. An
alternative viewpoint preferred to take the nation state as a given
constituent element of the contemporary international system, with
accompanying structures and constraints. However, this view
suggested that women and the induction of gender/comprehensive
security issues could play a mediating role to mitigate some of the
serious drawbacks of the current South Asian international system.
In more concrete terms, the first group for example would argue
for considering state violence by looking at presumed linkages
between the personal (including domestic violence), internal, and
international safety/security. In contrast, the second group would
argue for promoting such mechanisms as confidence building
measures and greater involvement of nongovernmental
organisations in traditional statecraft. While the latter can fit into
the former framework, clearly the point of departure for the two
is different. Moreover, the latter approach does not easily or
necessarily accommodate the former’s priorities.
The question of whether increases in the number of women in
higher echelons of power and policymaking alone was sufficient
or whether an altogether qualitatively different framework was
needed was debated a number of times. In other words, the issue
was whether changing the gender balance would accomplish
anything significant. The fact that presentations were made both
by analysts who promoted the importance of greater numbers of
women in security and foreign policy, as well as by experts who
challenged these very foreign policy and security structures,
allowed and indeed forced, participants to hear important opposing
opinions.
II. Defining and Redefining Security
A consensus on making the notion of security more “people
oriented,” rather than “territory oriented” was evident from the
outset. This preference was generally held across the spectrum of
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NGO to government experts. Beyond that, partly as a result of
the mix of participants, partly due to divergence in thinking, and
partly because of differences in priorities, the so-called traditional
versus nontraditional security concerns tended to “compete” for
salience at the Workshop.
A bridging of sorts between these two groups did occur at times,
best exemplified by the response to the Emmy award winning film,
“Selling of Innocents” which chronicled the trafficking of girls and
women from Nepal to India. The presence of the filmmaker, Ruchira
Gupta, who described the off camera making of the film added an
important dimension. A traditional or even “comprehensive security”
based meeting is most unlikely to have included this type of film
presentation on its program. Yet this film which interested an intricate
web of state boundaries, transnational economics, religion, patriarchy
and muscle power dramatically illustrated the need for combining
traditional security with nontraditional security concerns made a
great impact on members of the Workshop.
III. Uniqueness and Commonality
With 35 noted women from eight countries represented at the
Workshop, it was not surprising that country-specific and situation-
specific reports pointed to the numerous variations in context
and experience. Some commonality did stand out, particularly as
the presentations for the Roundtable on the status of Women in
International Affairs and Panel I: Gender Issues and
Comprehensive Security in South Asia, revealed.
There was great interest in learning more about the various situations
and drawing lesions from other cases. For example, the presentation
on conflict resolution in Uganda and the manner in which methods
were tailored to fit African circumstances and culture created
enormous interest across the board. What was particularly striking
for many South Asian participants was the terribly low level of
information and understanding about each other’s conditions, as
well as the acute dearth of opportunities for professional interaction.
Many commented that without this kind of Workshop, they would
never have been able to interact so freely and easily with
counterparts from the neighbouring countries.
Review of Working Groups
Three Working Groups were convened twice to focus specifically
on the sub-themes of “Revisioning Gender and International
Relations,” “Confidence Building,” and “Transnational Problems
in the Region.” Given the wide range of “Comprehensive
Security,” this was to facilitate more focused discussion and
thinking. The Working Groups were charged with developing
strategies and options for enhancing women’s participation and
decision making in official and nonofficial ways for problem
solving in common areas of concern, and assessing the potential
utility of professional networking. The Working Groups provided
a brief report of the plenary of their findings on the final day and
an overview is provided below. Recommendations which we made
are given later in this Executive Summary.
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I. Working Group A: Revisioning Gender and International
Relations
A major issue was the need to change ideas and modes of thinking
along with increasing the participation of women at
decisionmaking levels and in areas of security where women
have traditionally been underrepresented. There was concern
regarding the manner in which state borders are privileged above
trans-state issues like “refugee movements” which were compared
to a “river.” The call was for “softening” of borders in the region
to accommodate common problems. In this connection, the need
to redefine security was emphasised.
The Group referred to the “invisibility” of women in security
affairs despite direct impingement on women, for example in
laws regarding citizenship; and military violence. The need to
increase gender sensitivity in each of our own situations was also
highlighted. The group also pointed to the utility of empirical
work and the need for such additional work to locate and build
new theoretical approaches.
II. Working Group B: Confidence Building
Confidence building was seen as being relevant both across hostile
states and within states where internal conflict is occurring such
as in Sri Lanka. For some, building confidence among the
members of the Working Group itself was seen as an important
task. There was strong sentiment that Tracks II, and III must
influence Track I diplomacy. Confidence building needs to be
proactive and consider short term, medium term and long term
issues simultaneously, and somehow avoid turf battles for these
by the different Tracks. A fairly successful example of this was
noted with reference to the ASEAN Regional Forum where each
Track’s input is actively sought. More specifically, the utility of
a “Comprehensive Group of Eminent Persons” to give public
support to government institutions in confidence building which
could potentially run up against domestic opposition was
discussed. There was some sentiment that NGOs as such are not
as influential in South Asian as they are in the west. The role of
South Asian Non Residents in acting as catalysts was also touched
upon.
The Group attached great importance in focusing on win-win
situations in nonformal efforts across borders, which ensure that
there is no loss of confidence for any of the parties in the end.
Conventional confidence building measures were viewed as
insufficient in the South Asian context; other steps need to be
taken geared toward changing “mind sets.” Noncontroversial areas
should be tackled first, which hold the greatest promise of some
degree of success. It was suggested that the small and large
success stories in South Asian confidence building need to be
publicized in the media to the wider domestic audience, along
with successes of each other, in an attempt to counter the cycle
of generally negative publicity South Asian countries tend to
accord each other. It was believed that economic imperatives of
individual countries may influence confidence building positively.
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The role of women in confidence building and particularities
therein was debated without reaching any strong consensus. The
Group underlined that women could and should play an important
part at Track I, II and III. To make the decision processes in
security more gender aware, it was suggested that women speakers
specifically from conflict situations or conflicted areas need to
heard (at all Track levels). It was also suggested that women who
are working in various capacities in internal security need to be
included in networks such as this, along with women in other
political arenas including regional or state assemblies.
III. Working Group C: Transnational Problems in the Region
This Group identified a number of issues which either requires
cross border efforts or is desirable to approach in cross border
terms. These issues included poverty which cuts across the region
in significant ways; shared environmental concerns; religion and
social impact; the nature of patriarchal institutions and socio-cultural
aspects; and the position of women in conflict situations.
Several strategies were considered by the Group to enhance the
role of women. One basic need focused on advocacy to deconstruct
stereotypes. The need to build consensus was pointed out,
especially through multi-level networking at the local, regional
and international level. Methods to enhance skills of women in
leadership was viewed as critical.
It was suggested that a level mechanism such as a Regional
Tribunal at the SAARC level be set up to specifically address the
following: women in armed conflict situations; refugee women;
women being trafficked; and migrant women labour. For
transnational victims, a mechanism for “compensation” was seen
as necessary since they can easily “fall through the cracks” of the
system as it stands. It was noted that a Fund to finance some of
these ideas would be important for actual implementation.
Follow on Recommendations
These recommendations and suggestions are derived from the
Workshop and post-Workshop communication with some
participants.
1. Each participant submit a Note of no more than two to three
pages on what “security” means in their view. This would be
an important exercise in gaining greater collective
understanding of a basic but terribly complex term.
2. Set up a Web site for South Asian Women in International
Security.
3. Create a Directory of women experts in security in the region.
To accomplish this, each participant should supply names,
address and brief bio-data of 3-5 others in the field.
4. Compile international laws/instruments relating to women
and security which have been accepted in the region.
5. Send Research Note to peace journals.
6. Initiate study to reconceptualise gender and security in South
Asia, keeping in mind particularly a South Asia wide
viewpoint. One subtheme identified is the link between
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violence in peacetime and violence in war. An overall
objective could be to contribute to the security/gender
discourse which is currently dominated by western scholars.
7. Develop roster of NGOs and groups in South Asia (and
elsewhere as relevant) involved in similar issues, for
networking, collaboration and mutual learning.
8. Relay Workshop recommendations to the Chair of the SAARC
Secretariat.
9. Establish subnetworks or separate networks along the lines
of the three Working Group subject areas. Specific suggestions
include:
a. Transnational – On issues of societal security, especially
affecting women and children, mount a special effort to
involve MPs, MLAs (national and  state) and officials,
male and female, in further networking.
b. Revisioning Gender and Security – Identify and conduct
theoretical and empirical studies. Work which is occurring in
South Asian countries (which appears to be largely empirical)
needs to be coordinated and disseminated effectively.
 c. Confidence Building – Utilize the network for promoting
more positive images of each other. Institute cross country
study groups which mirror ongoing official talks or take
up issues in anticipation.
10. Constitute a small core group to evolve modalities for planning
continuing traveling Workshops to widen networking.
11. Hold a workshop with women in government and bureaucracy
dealing with  security concerns, and NGOs for a brainstorming
to bridge the existing perceptual and experiential gap.
Common ground needs to be evolved.
12. Conduct one meeting to seriously and substantively identify
what the security concerns of the individual South Asian
countries are and hone in on common regional security
concerns. Examples – environment, economic restructuring
and women’s work force, along with drugs, trafficking and
terrorism.
13. Undertake a myth vs. reality exercise to consider how religion,
culture and education feed into threat perceptions and how to
counteract it.
14. For future meetings, include some male participants linked
with the security establishment.
15. To raise the visibility of women security experts, establish
contact with national T.V. and press agencies and provide
expert lists for interview and other purposes.
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‘What does Security Mean?’
Viewpoints from the discussion
A decade after the end of the Cold War, we are now at the
beginning of a new millennium and our understanding of the
context of security is undergoing fairly major change. Until now
we had essentially two schools of thought – the realist school
which stated that the states are the main building blocks of the
international system and their sovereignty is not limited. In this
approach, security is a matter of competition between states – it
is state-centered. But there is another approach which emerged
and came into its own during the later part of the Cold War and
that was a holistic perspective where scholars talked about people-
oriented security, and put people first.
Rather than looking at this purely as a male vs. female issue, we
can look at it as hegemony of the patriarchal discourse where
both men and women have been co-opted. There are of course
some men and perhaps a larger sum of women who have managed
to steer away from this discourse.
There is the whole notion about hegemonic masculinity and the
whole notion of realism where power is central – are women
able to look at power from a different perspective at all and if so,
what are those dimensions of power? And how much of the
gender and security agenda is a western agenda? Treating third
world women as one undifferentiated mass doesn’t really sensitize
one to the problem of security because even within the third
world victim-woman myth, there are several gradations. A middle
class woman from a third world country probably buys into the
power discourse much more easily than does a menial factory
worker. So there are both shared and non-shared perspectives
even within the third world.
Implicit in the current security notion is the view that states are
in competition with one another and that issues such as balance
of power and deterrence are the key parameters of the security
debate. That proceeds on the premise of the Hobbesian view of
nature that war is inevitable and therefore self-help and realism
determines that you somehow work out accommodation in a
situation where war is inevitable. Even in the west, where people
are pointing to the fact that women are not getting involved in
the security discourse and that women should participate more
effectively in the security discourse, people think what should
happen is that women should be more informed about the range
of the missiles, and the nuts and bolts of the nuclear system. That
is purportedly being informed about international affairs and
security affairs. That reinforces an area of diffidence for women.
We feel that unless we are well-versed in the nuts and bolts of
the nuclear establishment, we are somehow outside – we are
marginalized. I think the first thing to do is to decide that we are
not inconsequential to the debate. That we are, in fact, not required
to know the range of the Pershing missile, that that does not
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really construe the be-all and the end-all of the security argument.
The other thing is starting from the western axiom that the personal
is the political – one can carry that one step further and say that
the international is the personal for women. Because whether we
like it or not, we are enmeshed in it all and we are actors and
actresses in this international system of security vs. insecurity.
Whether we are part of the tourism trade, whether we are women
who serve as soldiers on bases, whether we are in factories in what
is called the trade-free zones of Latin America, whether we are on
the plantations of Latin America, whether we are in the Philippines
or Vietnam or in Sri Lanka, we are all servicing an international
system where masculine hegemony is established.
And we all are ambivalent about both our locations in and our
relations to that system. Our identity in that system is not fixed
– it varies – our identities are in flux depending on whether we
assume the role of consumer at one given location or victim at
another given location. But we are already part of that international
system and by virtue of being part of that international system,
we have to realize that we are no longer just victims. We have
to realize that we are no longer – even though we are marginalized
in terms of the discourse, we are actually what makes the
international system run. And recognition of that would move
our involvement with issues of security much further.
On the issue of male/female difference, it appears that suddenly,
liberation in women and the coming to terms with security issues
has become a gradual, actual, masculinization act in itself. The
initial effort of the women’s movement was an attempt at
feminizing security, trying to feminize a look at power through
a feminine perspective, but in fact the reverse is happening. When
it comes to issues of power, there’s actually a masculinisation of
women because those women who accept the agenda traditionally
set by patriarchal or male roles, get absorbed into it and become
role models and they are the ones who set agendas and therefore
they become very critical actors in the whole process of actually
voicing that kind of discourse and making it more acceptable.
It’s also the whole business of shifting the conceptual vocabulary
– creating an alternative vocabulary. The current discourse
concentrates on formal legal structures and tends to be institution
and state-centric. Civil society is not a major concern or even
included in these discussions. We’re discussing threat perceptions
purely from the governmental – from the state point of view. The
other things it that the contemporary discourse on security does
not look at the fact that there are sizable sections of the population
within the country that does not necessarily reflect the
government’s point of view. And those are sections that the
women’s discourse needs to give a voice to – not just women but
the sections that do not necessarily agree with the existing security
debate or discourse. They somehow do not even enter the columns
of the newspaper. So there has been a kind of marginalization of
public opinion. And it is not that these voices are not there – they
are very much there – but somehow they are not allowed to enter
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into the mainstream. And when we talk about ideology, we’re
not talking about crude propaganda. Ideology works most subtly
and most effectively by excluding things from discourse –
exclusion is the most subtle form of the ideological state apparatus
functioning.
In the debate it has been continuously reinforced that states are
rational actors. Going back to the Hobbesian individualistic state
of nature – Hobbes’ men are basically unmothered individuals
who come from this state of nature – they are unmothered.
Subaltern groups and voices do not fit into the discourse, there
is little access to information because it’s always shrouded in
mystery. The presumption is that you cannot understand security
issues – they’re far too complex, far too technical. And therefore
there is a vested interest in keeping the level of discourse at the
purely technical and non-human level. Because the moment it
translates into vocabulary that people can empathize with or at
least share or begin to understand, then it no longer remains the
preserve of the authority of the security establishment.
Then of course there is the changing nature of the nation-state
itself. The security debate continues as though the nation-state
hasn’t changed one bit. It’s still the preferred model. It’s amazing
how many of our security experts still talk about deterrence as
a viable way of determining international relations. People whom
we respect very highly for their intellectual acumen are still
talking about deterrence. There is a tension between political
independence and economic inter-dependence, and sovereignty
vs. economic inter-dependence. This has not been substantially
understood – or at least cognized – in the security debate. Issues
of poverty, dispossession, and displacement never enter into the
security debate and so when you don’t look at poverty and you
don’t look at displacement, you don’t look at women. You leave
out a large section of the population.
And part of this mythology is that security acknowledges violence
and war and women, by nature – you know, again a very
essentialist argument is imported – women, by nature, are not
supposed to be inclined toward conflict and war, although we
know that that is not the case. So that’s another great lacuna.
Many analysts have pointed out that the South Asian countries
are quite comfortable living in a world of greater ambiguity about
what is deterrence. There is a certain existential feeling that yes,
there have been tests and we have therefore shown a level of
credibility and that’s enough – one doesn’t have to go down the
road of rapid escalation. And when you’re sitting in the U.S., one
also hears the opposite – why is there not a transparent doctrine
about nuclear weaponry? Why is there not a command and control
being set up very clearly? Whereas the Indian perspective seems
to be – we don’t want to go down that road of the nuts and bolts
of bean counting – how many weapons, where is it being targeted,
who is targeting, do we have all that and so on? That is actually
a dangerous kind of spiraling. You can’t turn the clock back but
the question is and how do you approach that?
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There are certain cultural, historical predilections that allow a
woman to be less masculinist, less aggressive – not that they
want to be, I’m not saying that we are inherently less aggressive
– but there is a certain cultural condition that allows you to live
in this world of ambiguity that the western world cannot accept.
It’s very difficult for them to accept this ambiguity – they want
everything laid out, they want a cost-benefit analysis, they want
a problem-solving method. So these methodologies don’t
necessarily mesh together.
On the point about the rationality of the regime – if we take the
example of the tests, it’s not just rationality of the regime, it’s
narrowed down to rationality of who is in power. Because the
regime was actually divided – those in the opposition questioned
that rationality. Those who are in power decide and they are correct.
The rest of the decision makers are then wrong and cannot question
it. Just like in the military where you cannot question in a situation
of military tension. So there was a transferring from the military
into the civil sphere – you were not allowed to question what the
government was doing even if you were part of the opposition.
There is a large part of the population whose opinion is never
sought, when it comes to foreign policy issues. Take elections
for the last decades – how many times have foreign policy issues
occupied a key place in electoral manifestos. Rarely. People are
rarely ever consulted. There is the view that people in Pakistan
will not accept a peace with India if the Kashmir problem is not
resolved according to what they expect. Have the people ever
been actually consulted? Does it matter to them? What we really
need to do is to take different segments of civil society and get
them involved in the security process. In India, the intelligentsia
is told to tow the line or they are isolated or they are debunked
as anti-nationals. It is easy to discredit a person.
There is no space for dissent in this kind of discourse and that
is what you need to create – you need to create space where
different opinions can find a voice. It doesn’t exist at this moment.
Somewhere along the lines, you need to bring a home-grown
solution to what your foreign policy problems are. In India and
Pakistan, the debate on Confidence Building Measures has gone
forever, focused only on the military issues, without looking at
deeper factors. Look at the history books of the two countries –
they are coloring the minds of generations to come, poisoning
their minds. The media does the same thing.
Unless there is a diversification at the grassroots level and you
start questioning and involving different sections of society in
the discourse, a handful of people are not going to make a
difference – because they will be co-opted eventually. Even if
there was a woman on the National Security Advisory Board,
could she take a different stand and stay put?
It’s not just a woman’s participation, which is important. We
have woman prime ministers, we have woman opposition leaders,
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but what about the position of women in the larger sense? And
it’s not the women alone who can participate in women’s issues.
Male and female should both be involved.
The security discourse must be conceptualized in a way that goes
beyond the concept of force. In realist thinking, it is only the
state that is a referent but we can have multiple referents. The
state remains naturally the primary referent but the scope should
be broadened, especially in the South Asian case. For many South
Asian people, there is endemic political violence and instability,
the threat of surprise terrorist attacks, acute water shortages, the
ill effects of deforestation, refugee cross-border movements –
these are more real, more threatening than the high politics of
States.
However, as someone has written, anything bad will come under
the scope of security. We should create certain criteria so that the
concept does not get diluted.
Women and Perceptions of State and Security
in Sri Lanka
Kishali Pinto-Jayawardene
The following is based on data which is still tentative because
we still haven’t finalized many of the statistics, but I hope to
highlight certain trends in our research in Sri Lanka.
Specifically, it focused on issues of state security and governance.
The study examines governance and the role of women in the
governance process in Sri Lanka. For vast numbers of women in
my country and for vast numbers of men as well, the many
political and social forces that have shaken the life of Sri Lanka
in the last few years – the violent forces – have really transformed
perceptions of state and security.
Women’s response to the violence has been constrained by a
particular social, economic, and legal framework, which is
essentially patriarchal. And that continues to limit their responses.
This has been very unfortunate in a country that had a very
strong woman prime minister in the 1970s and which has a very
charismatic woman president at the moment, and always this
contrast is pointed to by analysts – asking why when we have
very strong women at the head of our political institutions, why
it has not percolated down to the women in general.
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And the point that we have made in our study is we have looked
at women in the formal and informal political process and we
have said that while women in the formal process are confined by
many factors that are common in the South Asian region, women
beyond that – in the informal process – are at a greater disadvantage
because there is very little challenge to the construction of the
public sphere and the State as masculine and male-dominated.
And though there has been some acknowledgment of women’s
concerns – for example, setting up of the Women’s Commission
– that has remained very artificial, it has not been substantial in
changing the degree of incorporation of women’s perceptions into
political processes. For example, the notion of citizenship is applied
differently to men and women. Citizenship is not central to women
– women can’t pass citizenship on to their children, only the men
can do it. In terms of immigration laws, women are again
differentiated. People use these discriminatory laws to their own
advantage to carry on a particular political vision. We have said
that this has remained so even though there is a significant number
of women in politics. We don’t have women’s issues being
articulated in those institutions.
Our study also makes the point that women’s traditional roles
have undergone drastic change because of civil unrest in the
1980s and the ongoing ethnic conflict. This has catapulted women
into the uncharacteristic role of soldier and head-of-household.
Despite these changes, deep patriarchal roots still undermine
women’s full and equal participation in the public sphere.
Through these themes, we’ve looked at how women define the
state, women’s interactions with the state and the state’s current
limitations in its obligations to its women citizens. We have made
the point that alternative ways of governance has taken on greater
significance to women in terms of the political processes currently
being shut out from women because of the very deep level of
violence that is prevalent in those structures. So, for those women
involved in both formal and informal politics, there is a need to
redefine the state – to look at it as a gender-neutral force – to make
the point that it’s very important for women to look at the state as
a force from which they can draw on their rights as women and
not merely as people who don’t have any rights of their own apart
from those shared with the men. They tend to identify the state as
with the men and not something they can draw on.
The study has been divided into two parts. The first part has 500
women drawn from across the country randomly. We interviewed
them with specific questions on the state, security, governance,
political process, violence, etc. The second part dealt with
interviews with women activists, professionals, politicians – we
asked them how they defined politics, what was lacking in the
political processes and how they thought this process could be
improved so that their participation could be much more viable
and impacting.
What we found was that in the formal political processes few
women politicians generally asserted female characteristics and
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interests. The popular belief among them is that cannot and will
not change the status quo. While many are paying lip service to
the cause of women, the tendency unabashedly affirmed by them
is to carry on the agendas of their husbands, fathers, sons or
political parties. We found many women who come into politics
in that manner – their action in politics was limited by their
manner of entry. If not through their husbands, or fathers being
assassinated it is by knowing a politician who sponsored their
entrance – they feel they are beholden to this particular person.
They have to go back to consult them if they have a problem and
they thought this was something positive. They feel like they
can’t act independently because they are obligated to these men
– they can’t oppose them.
There was this whole issue of women in minority parties in the
context of the ethnic conflict. Numerically, the numbers of Tamil
and Muslim women in parliament are low and with the
breakdown of the political life in north and east of the country,
the concerns of women in that area have departed from any
question of political participation – there are only questions of
survival. They do respond – women’s groups in the north and
the east – when you talk to them about security and the state
but the response is one of complete disassociation from this
process. They would say – don’t talk to us about this, we are
completely fed up, we don’t want to get involved, the entire
process is corrupted, we just want to look after ourselves day
to day.
One woman whom we spoke to who came from an ordinary
family. She expressed the view that women would participate in
violence as much as men – they didn’t have any problem being
aggressive. It was a very definitive indication of how they are a
part of the same violent trends.
Look at what happened in the 70s and 80s in the south of country.
You have mothers of disappeared sons – captured and killed by
the security forces – protesting against the violence. But that
protest was as mothers. When the politicians responded to them
as mothers, the women agreed to be used as agents of the political
parties. Once one of the political parties came to power, then the
women completely moved to the background – their concerns
were no longer taken into account. But the women never asserted
themselves as citizens, only as mothers.
I’d like to highlight some of the data. Women described security,
and the state and politics, as something which men are basically
engaged with. 81% exercised the right to vote; the reason given by
those who had not voted was that it was because they were not
registered, not because they didn’t think it was important. Those
who did vote – 33% said they would vote like how their family
voted, 23% said they would vote the way their husbands voted.
Many of them openly say that they vote how their men vote.
There were questions on how they understood state and
government. 66% of women and 72% of males could not articulate
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their understanding of government. They could not go beyond
yes or no questions. The majority who responded said that the
difference between state and government was completely
irrelevant to their lives and didn’t know why they would need to
be asked that question.
From minority respondents – their response to the questions was
not from a textbook. They said that they got the information
from the media, for example. They said the government was a
political party while the state was some entity backed up by
which they could assert their right to their needs being addressed,
irrespective of whether they were male or female. This is
something that should be explored in later surveys.
Women expressed widespread disillusionment with the state, but
there was also a going-back to the state; they couldn’t name other
groups – like activist groups – to go to. Activist groups had a certain
role in civil society and that did not extend to the political sphere.
The majority of the respondents didn’t belong to any community
groups or social organizations. They said that they had no time
or interest – the male members in their families engaged in those
activities. There was a very large number that said they did not
represent the state and government and they felt that the state
and government represented them. It was very interesting because
I wouldn’t have expected it. They said – we can lay claim to
certain rights but the articulation will not go beyond that.
Many are illiterate – 43% were at the basic level stage, 60% had
grade O-level stage, 20 participants had passed the A-level stage.
Both men and women said that politics is not exclusively male
– that women could participate in it – theoretically it was asserted
but practically it wasn’t accepted. We perceived that the
respondents felt the need to be favorable in their responses to us,
but when we got specific, their responses were not very
encouraging.
On violence in the country – the last elections in early 1999 was
the most violent in the country. We saw the phenomenon of
gender violence – women brutalized in the streets, women being
stripped. Sri Lanka did not have this level of violence before and
it’s something we thought we should address in subsequent studies.
Most women who have entered into politics in the last two decades
have been daughters, mothers and wives of political figures, and
they have inherited from the men certain structures of politics
and violence. Eventually they become willing or unwilling
perpetrators of violence and corruption. They see themselves as
having no choice but to follow traditional political loyalties.
We have also looked at what should be done. For example,
creating consciousness and creating a space for women in the
margins to be heard and a face to be seen – for women to transcend
barriers that the patriarchy has enforced. We have examined
certain structures of NGOs and civic organizations in Sri Lanka.
A very interesting phenomenon is a political movement mostly
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of Singhalese and Tamil women, transcending minority barriers
that have been very obvious and difficult in Sri Lanka in the last
few years. We made an interesting study of this organization. It
was chartered in 1998 as an attempt to provide relief to women
displaced by conflict and to protect and promote harmony in the
country where there is a large Indian population. This organization
later got into community development and social mobilization
activities around issues of poverty alleviation, women’s
empowerment, micro credit help, nutrition, education, reproductive
rights and health, environment and peace. The current membership
of the organization, including men and women, is about 28,000.
 Because of the failure of the government to respond to their
demands and a real sense of disenchantment with the governance
mechanism, they themselves contested the provincial elections in
April 1999. It was interesting because we saw men contesting on
a gender platform. These men addressed meetings on that platform.
For me, it was a startling experience that they could identify
themselves so openly with gender concerns. The problem was
that the impact of the extreme violence meant that on Election
Day, the polling was miniscule, they couldn’t get even the
members to go to the polls. As a result, monitors couldn’t go to
the elections, voters couldn’t vote. But they are still fighting. We
see the development of such organizations being very significant
in Sri Lanka. The other problem is that if they did win, how
could they remain a distinctive identity once elected? We talked
to them about this and they said they could maintain this gender
platform once elected.
We also focused on the efforts of women in the north and the
east to cope with the violence. We talked to survivors and asked
them how they dealt with the daily life situations in those areas.
There is extreme violence in their lives. What we found was that
in the north, there was a very distinctive pattern of women
politicians asserting themselves as mothers. The Tamil woman
MP who was assassinated – she had declared herself beyond
assassination because she was a mother. We asked the women in
the north what would have happened if she had been a strong
male – they said she would have been taken more seriously.
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One can approach the South Asian region in different ways. One
way to see it is as a regional cohesive subsystem - pointing to
things like SAARC - especially as a regional economic entity on
the lines of ASEAN and NAFTA. According to many analysts,
that is really the wave of the future – regional integration, regional
economic blocks.
Another way is looking at it as a social, cultural entity. The
region does have a shared political, colonial and post-colonial
history. For example, if you look at Islam as practiced in South
Asia, it would be very different from the Islam practiced in the
Middle East, and one could see that as a set of shared
characteristics.
Another way is to look at the region as centred around a single
major country, – India – with a certain amount of influence in the
region. One could see the exercise of this influence as a benign
one, or a not-so-benign one. Perhaps the benign view could be
epitomized by the Gujral doctrine, good-neighbor policy, not
demanding reciprocity at some levels – one is not expecting
Bangladesh or whatever to reciprocate its concessions. Of course,
the Gujral doctrine may present itself in one way, but Bangladesh
may have a totally different perspective on it, say on the river-
sharing agreements. The not-so-benign could be epitomized by
the Indira Gandhi period. In this case, I think perceptions matter
a lot – big country, small country perceptions of the same thing.
These are things that one would have to examine closely.
There is a school of thought that talks about the provision of so-
called public goods by a big country or a big actor in the system.
For example, the Indian market is obviously the largest one in
the region. In a period where there is economic distress in many
markets, suppose India could say – okay, we will keep the markets
open for your goods. It would be acting in a way that would not
necessarily be in its own interests – at least not immediate interests
– but it would be providing a so-called public good. One could
see a possible Indian role that way down the line if the South
Asian Preferential Trade Agreement actually gets going.
Perceptions matter because provision of public goods by one
party may seem like complete self-interest to another.
Another way to look at it is to see South Asia as a fractured
subsystem. In other words, you could even see different countries,
literally trying to “escape’’ South Asia. For example, Pakistan
has been trying to reorient itself toward the Middle East and
West Asia. India, in similar fashion, has tried to be a world
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player – not just being confined to South Asia. India sees itself
as a world player – which of course Nehru tried to do in the 50s
and it played out in a different way. If you look at Nepal – Nepal
is, of course, connected to India but it still has certain orientations
toward China. In a way, it’s trying to escape and circumvent the
Indian influence. Even though the Hindu identity is there, on the
other hand, there’s political distance that is being cultivated. Same
thing with Myanmar. Both China and India are trying to make
sure that there is a certain amount of distance between India and
Myanmar. Bangladesh, in a similar fashion, has tried to reassert
the Islamic identity, again, trying to not just be grouped with
South Asia. Sri Lanka, I think has always thought of itself as
apart from South Asia because of its human welfare standards.
It’s always characterized itself as global in a sense – much more
outside of South Asia – of course the Buddhist/Hindu issues are
there as well.
Dr Chenoy:
There are many issues that can be seen as showing commonalities
– the common threats to the environment, for example. What we
do filters on to the rest of South Asia. While the bomb issue was
basically between India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal could
have protested that tests and the like could affect their environment
severely. The fact of our common poverty and our ways of
approaching it is another commonality. It could be argued that
we are all spending more and more on defense instead of spending
money to address poverty related issues. And there is our whole
situation vis-à-vis globalization. We’re all going to be facing
similar problems with globalization – there are the same
multinationals in Bangladesh and India with the same regulations.
And if we have to fight things like GATT or WTO, the only
people who will understand your kind of approach will be in this
South Asian subsystem.
Then there are the contradictions and divisions – questions of
national identity, communal divisions, and borders. These are the
central problems and if you examine them, you can see that what
is dividing us is all “constructed.’’ They do not have a material
base. They are constructions of regimes and actors. Threat
perceptions are not necessarily linked to what people think. So
in order to negate what divides us, you have to have a people-
to-people connection. Because what will and should bring us
together are the natural issues – which are not constructed – they
are the issues of the common people. There has to be voices and
movements to challenge these false constructions built by people
interested in capturing power.
Shaheen Afroze:
Most of the people in Bangladesh would feel there are certainly
elements of both commonalities and differences. But mainly things
are played out in terms of India and Pakistan – there are many
things different between them in their relationship. Like when
you say India and Pakistan have bombs, there were repercussions
in Bangladesh, there was concern. Bangladesh was concerned
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because if there is a nuclear war, nobody will be spared. But
then again, on Kargil, people are not that bothered even on the
government level. They think it is India and Pakistan’s ‘internal’
problem. They are a little concerned but not to the extent that
it will matter. Again, all the other states, they have borders with
India but they don’t have borders with each other. They see
India as always hegemonic and imposing. And even now in
Bangladesh, even today, there is a mixed feeling about India’s
imposing nature. But again, they do talk about – in the academia
– they do try to talk about the commonalities that you have just
now mentioned and about how to solve these common problems
together.
Think tanks like ours have taken up projects and are working
towards it. In my institute, we have instituted a dialogue series
with the northeastern states of India with the view that there will
be more cooperation. Why are there mixed feelings, however?
Why is there an anti-Indian feeling even today in Bangladesh
when the government-level relation is quite good? The
Bangladeshi market is flooded with Indian goods, but we can’t
get into your markets, though we have many things to offer you.
There is no border – actually there is no border. I know a person
who came to Calcutta with no passport and no Indian money and
stayed for a couple of days and then went back to Bangladesh.
One speaker raised a point here that in Pakistan, “they will take
Indian money, but they won’t take Pakistani money in India.’’
The overall conclusion expressed was that while there were many
things that created hostility in people’s minds and blocked
cooperation, this was now the age of cooperation, and it was
time it was talked about in real terms. And that it must be made
to happen.
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